A DIFFERENT YOM KIPPUR
This past Monday, Jews celebrated the most solemn
holy day in their calendar, Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement).
On the Sabbath day of October 6th, 1973, as all of Israel came to a standstill to observe the High Holiday of Yom Kippur, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack against Israel, knowing she would be caught off-guard.
In the first few critical days, the Egyptians
had crossed the Suez Canal and were pushing Israeli forces back into the
desert. In the Golan Heights, the Syrians had broken through the undermanned
Israeli line and were advancing toward the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee).
Since the bulk of the Israel army is made up of 80% reservists, it took two days for them to mobilize and deploy. It was only the vastly outnumbered soldiers in the front and Israeli pilots that held the line and stalled the attackers. It was their heroism and sacrifice that “compensated” for the serious lack of sufficient equipment and supplies, and saved the country from being overwhelmed.
One almost unknown factor, proved to be perhaps
the most significant breakthrough of the war. On
Friday, Oct, 12, 1973, at 2:30 pm, Prime Minister Golda Meir convened her
so-called "Kitchen Cabinet" – the small forum that made the Israeli
government's major military-political decisions. The Yom Kippur War had entered
its seventh day, and the discussion centered on one fateful question: should
the IDF cross the Suez Canal the next night.
After the IDF had successfully pushed the
Syrian army back from the Golan Heights, breaking through the Syrian border,
the war's center of gravity shifted to the south. These were the most crucial
moments on the Egyptian front. The decisive meeting took place in Golda's room
and included the director of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, GOC Southern Command Maj.
Gen. Haim Bar-Lev, and Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Benny Peled.
The situation reports presented at the discussion
were stark. Chief of the General Staff David (Dado) Elazar warned that with no
decisive victory the forces would grow exhausted, and proposed requesting a
ceasefire. Benny Peled said that the Air Force had already lost a large number
of planes and that it was nearing the threshold of 220 planes – which, if
reached, would mean it could no longer assist the ground forces.
Then, before the Deputy Chief of Staff had a
chance to sum up the discussion, the Mossad head, was called away to answer an
urgent phone call from his bureau chief.
Upon his return to the room, Zamir said that he
had received a "golden piece of information," according to which the
Egyptian army was preparing a paratrooper assault on the Mitla and Gidi Passes
within a day or two. The operational conclusion was that the armored divisions
would follow.
The crossing of the canal was suspended; the IDF was to organize for a defensive battle, lay in wait for the Egyptian forces, contain the attack – and then begin the crossing of the canal.
The little known detail is the identity of the
man responsible for supplying the vital information: an officer in the Egyptian
Army. He was recruited by the Mossad as a spy, who passed on internal
information to the Israeli intelligence community. To this day, the Israeli
Military Censor is wary of revealing details about him, even refraining from
publishing his code name.
The information provided by the Egyptian source
led to a turnaround in the war; the IDF, which up until then had been losing on
the southern front, was now able to take the initiative.
Even though Israel
was eventually able to achieve a military victory, the country paid a steep
price, both in lives lost, and in the citizenry’s confidence in their leaders
and themselves. Almost 3,000 soldiers gave their lives; which is a ratio
of 1 per 1,000 Israelis; a steep and painful price for a nation of three
million. Over 10,000 were wounded in the 17 days of fighting.
Comments
Post a Comment